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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\ 
WELDON R. REEDER, · 
Plaintiff and Appellant,) 
vs. I 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP., \ 
a Corporation, 
Defendant and Re.spondent. 
BRIEF OF 
APPET_jLANT 
Appeal No. 8601 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 3, 1955, plaintiff and appellant, Weldon 
Reeder, entered into a contract (Pl. Ex. B) with the 
Valley ~fotor Company of Logan, Utah, for the purch-
ase of a 1955 special order Buick Sedan, turning in 
a used car worth $2075.00 as part payment. The Valley 
Motor Company, an authorized dealer of the defendant, 
then placed an order for this automobile with defendant. 
(Pl. Ex. 3) This order was received by the defendant on 
January 4, 1955. (Tr. 48 and 49) 
Plaintiff's order bearing his name wa.s placed into the 
production schedule in the regular course of defendant's 
business and production or manufacture of said vehicle 
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2 
eompleted on January 14, 1955. (Tr. 49) On January 17; 
\"'"alley :\1 otor Company notified Defendant that plaintiff 
d~sired factory delivery and this was arranged pursuant 
to a factory delivery authorization form of General 
1\lotors Corporation (Pl. Ex. 1) This form indicated that 
plaintiff was to pick up the Buick on the morning of 
,January 20th, 1955, at the Customer Drive-_._.\ w·ay at 
Flint, ~Iichigan, where it was to be delivered b~~ the 
factory prior to that date. On January 18, 1955, defendant 
delivered the Buick Automobile to the Customer n·rive-
~\,vay in the name of the plaintiff (Tr. 49 and 50 and Pl. 
}~x. 2), at "rhich time a Bill of Sale \Yas executed by 
defendant in favor of General ~rotors .... ~cceptanee Cor-
poration. (Pl. Ex. C) At the same time, a car invoice 
\Ya~ executed sho"ring the car a~ having been sold to 
(I eneral Motors A .. cceptance Corporation (hereinafter 
referred to as G l\tiAC) for retail delivery to the plain-
tiff. (Pl. Ex. D) On this san1e forn1, the car invoice, (pl. 
r~x. D) "'"aS a Sight Draft payable to G:JL'"~r to be dra\Vll 
nn \...-alle~'" -:\1 otor Con1pany, the retail dealer, not due until 
.l a nuary 26, 1955. Also, on the bottoin of the Bill of Sale 
( 1~1. ~~x. C) frou1 defendant to G~LA.C \Yas a Trust Re-
eeipt hPt,veen G~fAC and the said \...-alley :hiotor Coln-
pany, together \Yith a promis~ory note fro1n , .... alley :\Io-
tor ('io1npany to G~fAC not due until Jauary 26, 10:1;). 
Eaeh of thesP documents to-,Yit: The Notice of Shipment 
( J~jx.:2), the Billof Sale (Ex. C), and the Car Invoice 
( J~jx. D) bore plaintiff's name upon it .. and the Notice 
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of ShiplllPnt bore the notation aft(•r plaintiff':-~ na1ne: 
'"1-:20-_A __ . ~I.". \vhieh corresponded to the scheduled ch·-
liver~· date sho\vn on the factory delivery authorization 
forrn. (Ex. 1). 
On !January 18, 19;)5, plaintiff regi:-~tered the C'ar in 
his na1ne and securred license plates. for it. (Tr. 19, 20, 
Ex. 4) 
The plaintiff n1ade arrange1nents to go hark to Flint, 
1Iichigan on January 20, 195;), (Tr. 20) bnt \Va~ de-
layed because a truck \vhich a friend of his \Vas to driv<· 
hack fro1n 1fichigan for \:alley Motor Company would 
not be ready until about January 25, 1955, and plaintiff 
and his friend -vvere planning to make the trip together. 
(Tr. 21) 
On January 25, 1955, at about one o 'cock in the 
afternoon, plaintiff called the defendant's Custon1er 
Drive-A way and asked if they had his ear there for hiln. 
(Tr. 22, 36 and 43) Plaintiff was advised that his car 
\Vas there and had been there since January 20th. He 
was asked why he had not picked it up. ('rr. 36, -+:1). 
Plaintiff advised defendant's Custo1ner Drive-A\\ra~r that 
he had been dela~red but that he -vvould he there in t\vo 
days. Plaintiff was advised by defendant's Customer 
Drive-Away that this would be alright, but that they 
\Vere charging him storage on the car. (Tr. 36, 43) 
Plaintiff agreed to this. 
The evening following plaintiff's afternoon conver-
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4 
sation with Defendant's Custon1er Drive-A,vay, 11r. Ray 
J)ihnon•, an emplo~ree of the defendant, called plaintiff 
ju~t as plaintiff was leaving to catch the airplane to 
Flint, and advised plaintiff not to go back to Flint. Ap-
parent!~"" no reason was given. Thi~ was the sa1ne em-
ploy<·P of th<-· defendant who told plaintiff on January 
2+, 19;):), that plaintiff's car never reached production. 
( Tr. 44, 46). 
In the afternoon of January 27, 1955, plaintiff ar-
rived at the defendant's Customer Drive-A\Yay at Flint, 
)'1 ichigan, and ultimately was shown to the office of :Jfr. 
I ... D. Burkhart, whose office was at the Customer Drive-
~\ "'ay, Flint, Miehigan. Plaintiff inquired about the 
car and was advised that "Well your automobile isn't 
here.'' ( Tr. 25) Following further conversation, plaint-
iff \Yas told: "Your car is being reshipped.'' (Tr. 26) 
]~lain tiff then inquired: "Had I been here on January 
the 20th eould I have gotten n1y automobile~'' ~fr. Burk-
hart told plaintiff "Yes'' (Tr. 26) 
On January 26, 1955, the car distribution department 
o I' dPfPndant ·s Buick ~rotor DiYision notified the Drive-
~\ \\Tay· Departn1ent of Buick l\Iotor Division to return 
thP ear for ship1nent and the next day plaintiff's automo-
bilP \Va~ shipped to another dealer. (Tr. 51) 
Plaintiff returned hon1e and on June 28, ,1955 com-
HlPnePd this aetion against Defendant. 
Plaintiff allPgP<l eonver~ion on the part of the de-
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fendant in refusing to surrender posse~sion of ~aid auto-
Inohile to him and in selling it to another, contrar~~ to 
the right of the plaintiff in the auto1nobile. Plaintiff dt~­
manded judgment in the amount of $3507.47 for the con-
\"er~ion. Defendants answer denied the allegation~ and 
a trial \Vas held before First District fJ udge Levvi,..; ,Jones, 
and a jury. _At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, thf~ 
defendant u1oved for a dis1nissal and for a (lirected ver-
dict. The court refused. _A_t thP end of tllP defendant'B 
t~Yidenee, botl1 parties n1oved for a Directed \T erdiet, and 
on the theory· that there was no controversary in the 
facts, and that all questions 'vere questions of law, the 
partie.s stipulated that the jury n1ight he dis1nissed and 
the matter handled by the judge in the forrn of a directed 
verdict. On October 8, 1956, the District Court entered 
the judgment appealed from granting defendant's ~'lo­
tion for a Directed Verdict. 
The District Court, in announcing its decision in 
open court, based its ruling in favor of the defendant 
upon one of two grounds: (1) That the defendant had the 
right to rescind the sale, or exercise the right of stop-
page in transitu, and (2) That under the trust receipt the 
security 'vas held in the car by General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corporation until the cash was received. (Tr. 
65, 66) 
STATEMEN1, OF POINTS 
That the District Court erred in granting de-
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fendant 's motion for a directed verdict and in failing to 
g-rant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict rnade at 
the conclusion of the evidence of the case. 
This being an appeal from a judgment entered on 
a directed verdict for the defendant, the evidence in 
the case must be viewed in light most favorable to plaint-
iff and all evidence favorable to the plaintiff must be 
accepted as true and as providing all farts which it 
reasonably tends to prove, and the plaintiff is entitled 
to the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible there-
fron1. 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Proced-
ure, Section 1075, Page 761, and cases cited therein . 
..:\.t the trial, the defendant offered no testimony 
fron1 \Yitne~set-', and the testirnony offered by the plaint-
j ff i~ uncontradicted. There appears to be no conflict of 
fact and the deter1nination of the respective right~ and 
<lntie~ of the parties lie~ in an application of .3tatutory 
rule~ of la\v to those facts. The particular statute~ in-
volved are the Trust Receipts .A.ct and the Sales ~\ct. 
J~oth lTtah and Michigan have adopted the l ... niform Law 
on each of these subjects, so reference in this brief will 
be 1nade to the lT tah I~a"" only. 
T,he plaintiff contends that he is a ·~Buyer in the 
< )rdinary c:onrse of Trade'' a~ defined in the Trust Rf·-
ePipt~ ~\et, ~Pe. 9-2-1, TT. l~ ... A. 1953, and is protected as 
~nell. r(1hp Plaintiff lllaintains that he \Vas the purchaser 
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of the auto1nobile in question and that he had the right 
of irn1nediate possession at the time the def(?ndant sold 
the autornobile for a ~econd time to a third party. 
The undisputed facts are that plaintiff entered into 
a contract to huy· a rar frorn defendant's authorized deal-
er. The dealer ordered the car fron1 defendant, in the 
narne of the plaintiff, and the defendant produced the 
car and delivered it to its Custon1er Drive-i\ \Vay in the 
narne of the plaintiff. .A_t the ~arne ti111P, defendant exe-
cuted a Bill of Sale in favor of General 11:otors ~L\.ceept­
ance Corporation, 'vho in turn gave a Trust Receipt in 
favor of the dealer with whon1 plaintiff had his con-
tract. In all of the documents refering to the car, plaint'"' 
iff '\vas identified as the retail purchaser of it. lTnder 
this arrangen1ent, General 1\fotors Acceptance Corpora-
tion \vas the en trustor, and \,.alley Motor Co1npany, the 
defendant's dealer with whom plaintiff contracted, was 
the trustee. And, at this point in the procedure, the de-
fendant had divested its self of title by virtue of the Bill 
of Sale to G-eneral 1fotor~ Acceptance Corporation. 
1. Was the plaintiff, on the facts, a Buyer in the Ordi-
nary Course of Trade and protected as sllch ·under Sec. 
9-2-1, u. c . .A., 1953? 
The above stated Section reads as follo,vs: 
''Buyer in the ordinary course of trade' rneans a 
person to whom goods are sold and delivPred for 
new value and who acts in good faith and with-
out actual knowledge of a limitation on the 
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trustee's liberty of sale, including one who takes 
by conditional sale or under a pre-existing mer-
cantile contract with the trustee to buy the goods 
delivered, or like goods, for cash or on credit ... '' 
The plaintiff meticulously fits into thi.~ definition. 
He \vas sold the goods by \r alley ~f otor Company· under 
a Retail Car Contract and paid $2075.00 for then1 in the 
forn1 of a trade-in. This comes within the phrase ''a pre-
existing mercantile contract \vith the trustee (\Talley 
2\f otor Con1pany) to buy the goods delivered for cash 
or on credit.'' There was no limitation on the trustee's 
liberty of sale, (See bottom of Ex. C for Trust Receipt) 
but even if there were the plaintiff's good faith has not 
been question and actual knowledge of any limitation has 
nPver been asserted. 
~\s to the delivery factor, no case la"~ has succintly 
placed the boundaries of the tern1 deliYery as here used. 
Its purpose, however, has been con11nented on as being 
a requisite to prevent collusive transactions ""'"here there 
i~ no actual sale. See Heindl, Trust Receipt Financing 
under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act., 26 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 197, 246 (1948). No such factor appears any,Yhere 
in this en~e, therefore the question of "deliYery" is not 
n ~uhstantial problen1. But be that as it may, there \Yas 
a dPlivPry in this ease \vhich should n1ore than satisfy the 
reqni retnPnt~ of the statute. ~\ t the tilne \ 7 alley ~Iotor 
l~ou1pan)c placed the plaintiff~ car order (Ex. 3) \vith the 
dPI'Pndant, a ~peeial shunp containing '"Flint Retail 
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Store, na1ne, date, time," was placed on this order over 
the plaintiffs nan1e and over the date and ti1ne "1-20 
r\~I ". When the plaintiff called aa a witness Mr. Robert 
Dilmore, who \Vas, during the tillH:' 0 r the tran~aetion 
1nentioned herein, a district 1nanager for Buick ~Iotor Di-
Yi~ion of the defendant General ~Jotors Corporation 
( Tr. 31), ~fr. Dihner 'vas asked the follo-\ving question: 
Question by ~1r. Olson: 
'· 'Vell, how does the Buick Division know that the 
ear should be kept at the customer drive-away rather 
than sent to the dealer)?'' 
.. A .. nswer by ~T r. Dihnore : 
"Well, that is established on that Wholesale Car 
Order Form by a special stamp." (Tr. 52) 
l\Ir. Diln1ore vvas then shown the wholesale car order 
and he identified the special stamp on it. ( Tr. 53) 
The question was then asked Mr. Dilmore: 
''So that when the dealer indicates that on the 
\vholesale order the custo1ner wants factory delivery and 
that stamp is placed on there, Buick Motor Division ac-
knowledges that information and agrees to deliver it to 
the Custonter Drive-Away~'' 
n{r. Dilmore's answer was:" That is right." (Tr. 53) 
Then, on January 18th, 1955, the defendant executed 
Exhibit 2, the Notie of Shipment giving notice that the 
automobile which had been manufactured or produced 
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pursuant to the order for plaintiff was shipped to de-
fPndant 's drive-away, Flint, Michigan. This Notice of 
Hhip1uent identifies a sales order. by Number 8091, the 
sa1ne nu1nber contained on the wholesale car order, 
J~~xhibit3. 
And there 1s no question but that the auto1nobile 
\vas· delivered to Customer Drive-A\\-ay by defendant.· 
rrhe question was asked the defendant, (Tr. 49): "Was 
the said vehicle ever delivered to Buick Customer Drive-
Answer: ''Yes.'' 
Question : ''If so, when~'' 
Answer : ''January 18, 1955. '' 
Question: ''If so, in the name of what custo1ner J?" 
.... \nswer : ' 'Weldon R. Reeder.'' 
Certainly this constitute8 a sufficient delivery. 
"f;l.,.hitn1ore Oxygen Co. vs. Utah State Tax Conun., 114 
ll. 1, 196 P(2d) 976, (1948) at Page 980: Haynes vs. Doug-
lu.-..· f<'ir J!J.r. C'~o., Ore., 90 P(2d) 761, (1939) . 
.:\nd see in this respect the Utah case of ]fiddleton vs. 
I~rnns, 86 1J. 396, 45 P. (2d) :170, (1935), \\'"herein this 
Court said : 
'·If there is an)· qupstion about the delivery in 
this case to the carrier being sufficient to consti-
tutP an· unconditional appropriation to this con-
traet, it "·ill hP 8Pttled h)· the fact that it i~ a \VPll-: 
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established rule that delivery to a person appoint-
ed by the buyer to receive the goods or to any third 
person at the buyer's request or with his consent 
is sufficient delivery to the buyer." Citing au-
thority. 
But to take the n1atter a step further, and assurn-
ing for purpo~~ of argun1ent that the facts ahove stated 
do not constitute a delivery under the Trust Receipts Act, 
it i~ snlnnitted that there are a long linP of cases holding 
that actualruanual transfer of pos~ession is not necessar~· 
to constitute delivery. In r·an Drinunelen Y~. Conrerse, 
190 lo\va 1350, 181 N. W. 699 (1921) it was stated that 
d Deliver~: does not irnply a physical change of location, 
hut is deterrnined h!r the intent of the parties at the 
tln1e of the sale to transfer to the vendee the dominion 
and control over the thing purchased". No part of the 
purchase priee in that case had been paid, nor had the 
hi1yer removed the goods fron1 the seller's prernises, 
·but is vvas the understanding of the parties that the buyer 
\vas to · · rernove the corn from the premises as soon as 
possible,'. The court held that this constituted sufficient 
deliYer~~ in construing the important delivery require-
Inent of the statute of frauds. 
· Similarly in the lavv of Bailments, wl1ere the lavv 
requiref-i a delivery of the property from the bailor to 
the bailee as an essential element of the baihnent contract, 
the lavv always recognizes a baihnent in situations where 
a vendor of goods retains possession of them under cir-
cumstances where the property in the goods has passed, 
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and hold thP vendor of the property to be the bailee 
even though there has been no physical delivery of the 
property to the bailee. 8 C. J. S. Bailments, 3 (g). 
In thP ca~e at bar, the automobile was shipped hy 
the deff·ndant to the Custo1ner Drive-A,vay in the na1ne 
of the plaintiff. It was to be picked up by the plaintiff on 
.f anuary 20, 19:1;). This \vas in lieu of the more usual 
ship1nent to the dealer and later delivery to the buyt>r. 
It \vas agreed by all concerned that the Custo1ner Driy·e-
_A_ \vay garage \vas to be the delivery point. This "~as cbn-
firnted hy a telephone conversation on January 25, 19;):-l, 
'vhen the personnel of the garage informed the plaintiff 
that they 'vere holding the automobile for hun charging 
him storage, and then inquired when he would be there 
to pick the car up. This, along with the 1nany documents 
that named the plaintiff and the place of delivery. would 
see1n to be sound proof of the intetion of the parties. 
Further, these facts are indicative of the accepted 
relationship between the parties. The garage was charg-
ing storage, fron1 the date of defendant's delivery to it 
on the 20th. T1hey \Yere bai1ees of the auto1nobile for the 
benefit of the plaintiff. the bailor. This is supported by 
the 1nany railroad carrier cases. \Vhich if not directly 
in point. are ver~T closely analagous to the present situ-
ation. In Nehneyer LuJuber Co. vs Burlington cf· llf. R. R. 
Co., ;)+ Neb. 321, 74 N. ,~v. 670 (1898), the court stated 
that ''When delivery is made to a carrier .. he is in conten1-
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plation of law the bailee of the person to vvhou1 and not 
h~~ 'vhom goods are consigned.'' 11 hus it has long been 
the rule of lavv that the vendee and not the vendor has thP 
ri~k of loss once deliver~T to the carrier has been xnade and 
has the right to sue the carrier for negligenee. 
Carrier's also charge storage on goods ready to be 
pieked up after the passage of frpe ti1ne, as do other 
hailee 's such as warehousemen at the end of the railroad 
line, and as we submit does the Customer Drive-Away 
Garage who is in receipt of an automobile shipped to 
them from the factory to be held for a buyer . 
.A_~ccording to the Notice of Shipment, (Exhibit 2) 
the auton1obile was shipped to the Customer Drive-Away 
G-arage on January 18, 1955 as per the agree1nent of the 
parties. Although the carrier is unknown, the evidence 
indicated that the auto1nobile vvas shipped and that it 
did arrivP at the garage. Sec. 60-3-6, 1T. C. _,.;\., 1953 indi-
eate~ that under this set of facts it is "deemed to be de-
liver~~ of the goods to the huyel' ... '' ~:lldrrJJI(U1 Bros. Co. 
v~.Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 92 Conn. 419, 103 A. 267 
(1918). The exception stated in Sec. 60-2-3, Rule (5), 
does not change this result. 
It should be firmly kept in xnind that at all tixne~ 
during the critical periods involved in this action th~~ 
property in the automobile had passed from the de-
fendant. 
Rule ;) of Section 60-2-3, l '. C. A., 19:13~ provides : 
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"If a contract to sell requires the seller to de-
liver the goods to the buyer, or at a partinlar place, 
or to pay the freight or cost of transportation to 
the huyer or to a particular place, the property 
. does not pass until the goods have heen delivered 
to the buyer or have reached the place agre~d 
upon.'' (Emphasis ours) 
See also Rule 2 concerning contracts to sell speeifir 
goods and Rule 4(a) coneerning contracts to sell unascer-
tained or future goods by description when goods of that 
deseription and in a deliverable Btate are unconditional-
ly appropriated to the contract. 
In Birdsong et al vs. W. H. d!; F. ,Jordon, Jr. Inc., 297 
Fed. 7 42, ( 1924) the court construed the N e'v York la"T 
in this respect by saying that 'vhen a chattel is to be de-
livered to a particular place and it is so delivered, title 
then passes. Possession of the goods has no bearing on 
the question of when title passes. The court also pointed 
out that title Ina~~ pass si1nultaneously to a buyer and 
to a purcha~er fro1n that buyer 'Yhen delivery i~ to be 
utade at the same time and place. 
The plaintiff submits that on the facts he "~as buyer 
1n the ordinary course of trade and the provisions of 
Sec. 9-2-9, (2) lT.C.A., 1953, apply. 
''r P turn no"~ to the que~tion of the right~ of the 
defendant in disposing of the ~\utomobile and the right.5 
of plaintiff under ~aid Sec. 9-2-9, (2) lT.C.A., 1953. 
I I. Did the defendant hal;e the rights of an entruster 
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,wnder the tr-tttst receipt issued on Jantutr,t; 18, l(J:).}.) 
The Trust Receipt \Vas i~~ lt\~1 h~; tl1 \ ·l· ,·(·n lr!lt 
naming General Motor's Acceptance Corporation, herein 
referred to as GMAC, as the entrustor and Valley Motor 
Con1pany as the trustee. This gave GMAC a security 
interest in the automobile and gave \Talley Motor Com-
pany the po\\~(Jl' to sell it, \Vh~eh, ot· conr."i(~. 1: 1 )(\:.~ ·"l~l d<Y:1~·. 
rrhe purpose of this transaction is evident. GMAC -be-
eornP~ the financing agency, paying the defendant for 
the autornobile and receiving by assignn1ent the rights 
of the seller. <+eneral Motors thereby avoids the financ-
ing ri~k and tlte administrative expense. The remain-
ing interest of the defendant is of a parental nature in 
looking out for a close business associate. Since Gen-
eral l\Iotors and GMAC are two separate corporations, 
to hold that General Motors can exercise rights assign-
ed to GMAC is to say that there is no distinction be-
t\veen the two. 
~\~su1ning, however, that the defendant can exer-
cise those rights the ques.tion becomes: ''Can those rights 
prevail over a Buyer in the ordinary Course of Trade~ 
See. 9-2-9 (2) rr.c.A., 1953, is emphatic when it says 
'' ... such buyer takes free of the entruster's security 
interest in the goods so sold . . . '' 
This result and it's justification can be found in 
Peoples Finance and Thrift Co. of f",isalia li. Bow·man et 
al, 58 Cal Ap 2d 729, 1:17 P2d. ( 194:1), a ea~P \\'hjeh 
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points out that it \Ya~ the InisplaePd confidence of the en .. 
trustor in the trustee's integrity that caused the loss. 
rl_lhe entrustor lllUSt stay (·onstistent with the faith hP has 
placed in his trustee. See also Conunercial Discount Co. 
n. ilfehne, 42 Cal i\p 2d 220, 108 P2d 73;), (1941). 
III. lJid the Defendant on the facts have right to e.rer-
("7Se an nnJHtid seller's lien 'Under Sec. 60-4-1, r1.C.~-1., 
In its oral decision, the lo,ver court indicated that 
defendant had the rights of an unpaid seller. to -"~it: 
right to rescind and stoppage in transitu. To exerri:'e 
such rights, the seller must comply 'vith the requisites 
as set out in the sales act. which is in effect both in lTtah 
and Michigan. 
a) Was the Defendant an unpaid Seller? 
The Bill of Sale and Invoice sho'v on their face 
that "rhen the title passed from General ~Iotors to 
GMAC, GMAC gave ''valuable consideration~·. The de-
fendant has stated that this eonsi8ted of a note that 'Ya~ 
] a tP r retu r11 ed under the date of Janna ry 31. 19:1~. This 
\Vas after the ronYersation in question and ha:' no bear-
ing on the postion of the seller at the thne of the con-
vPrsion. FurthPr it n1ust he pointed out that the letter 
snpposedl~r ~Pnt on .T anuar~~ 31. 1955 "~as stan1ped re-
Pived h~r thP addressee in .August of 1955, after suit had 
heen filed. That fact remains that at the thne of the 
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<'onversation on January 26, 19;)5, the seller had in his 
hand~ valuable consideration for the sale and transfer 
of the autoinobile. A negotiable note in thP hands of the 
~P ller 1nean~ that he ha~ been .. conditionally paid", 
that is, that he has surrendered the right to ~ue on the 
obligation until the instrument is due. 
But even assuming that the defendant had not been 
paid and that the goods had been sold on credit, the 
Sales Act onl~r allows exercise of the lien, upon which the 
right to rescind depends, when the terrn of crPdit has ex-
pired. (Sec. 60-4-3, lT. C. A., 1953) The tern1 of credit 
on all doctnnents bet"~een G :\J AC and their trustee, \r al-
ley· ~Iotor Con1pany, as well as on the note between 
(}"jL-\C and the defendant was January 26, 1955 and 
the auto1nobile was resold during that business day, 
prior to the statutory time for payrnent. Sec. 44-1-87, 
r~.c.A., 1953. This also goes to substantiate the fact 
that the defendant was not an unpaid seller. 
1\~. Right of defendant to e.rtrcise stopJHlffP i'JI tran.-.,·it1f. 
Stoppage in transitu, being an Pxtention of the 
rit!·ht of the seller's lien is subject to all the infirtnitie;-; 
already mentioned, to-wit: defendant is not an unpaid 
seller, or assun1ing the sale was made on credit, the ter1n 
of credit had not expired. Further under the clear word-
ing of the statute the goods were no longer in transit 
after the arrival of the goods at the appointed destina-
tion (The Customer Drive-Away), and after the carrier 
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ol' other hailt>e ackno\vledges to the buyer that he holds 
the goods on his hehalf and continues in posse~sion of 
them as bailee for the b.uyer. Sec. 60-4-7 (2) (b), li.C.A., 
1953. The phone call already referred to con1e.s directl~,~ 
\Vi thin this provision of the code. 
Even if this were not so, the defendant would still 
not have the right of stoppage in transitu in light of 
the counuon law doctrine laid down in J/ enzphis cf· L.R.R. 
Co. vs. Freed, 38 Ark. 614 (1882) and as more fully enun-
ciated in Neimeyer Lumber Co. v. Burlington & Jf.R.R. 
Co. :}4 Neb. 321, 74 N. W. 670 at page ()7(). \Yhere it \Ya~ 
held that "In order that a vendor of goods 1uay exer-
cise the right of stoppage in transitu, it i.s e~sential that 
the goods at the time be in transit from such vendor to 
his immediate vendee". This decision is based on the 
theory that consignment to a sub vendee makes inequit-
able a refusal of delivery based on the failure of the ven-
dee, to "~horn the vendor has extended trust and credit. 
T nherent in thi~ vie"~ is the fact that the Yendor has 
acquiesced in the sale to the ~ub-Yendee and i~ fully a-
'"arP of hi~ purchase and right~ in the good~. There 
<·an he litth~ que~tion that in the case at bar. the defend-
ant had full kno,vledge of the re~nle and the ~ub-YeiHiee ·~ 
right.-:; and interest in the auton1obile for the consign-
lll<>nt \\ra~ to a rle~tination eon1pletely out of reach of his 
iHnnediate huyer. \"'"alle~~ ~[otor Co1npany, and for the 
pu rpo~P of, a~ the e.onsignment indicates. deliYery to 
the plaintiff. 
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\~. Notwithstanding all of the above, if it is found 
that the defendant had either the right to exer-
cise an unpaid seller's lien or the right of stop-
page in transitu, the subsequent resale of the auto-
mobile was directly contrary in its timing and me-
thod to the remedy laid down in the Sales Act, 
Sec. 60-4-9, U.C.A., 193. 
The right of resale given in the Sales .. A_rt. 60-4-2, 
r~.c.A., 1953, is limited by Sec. 60-4-9. 
The resale of the goods rna~~ be 1nade if 1) ''the 
goods are of perishable nature''. Certainl~r not relevant 
here. 2) Where the seller expressl~~ reserves the right 
of resale in case of buyers default. Again not appli-
cable, because there was no evidence whatsoever of su(lh 
a reservation. 3) "Where the buyer has been in default 
in the pay1nent of the price an unreasonable time". As 
ha~ heen pointed out, the buyer was not even in default 
at all. In the first place, defendant, in the Bill of Sale 
executed hy it, acknowledged payment, and in the sec-
ond place, assuming credit was involved, the resale here 
\vas 1nade on the same day that the credit extended -vvas 
to n1aturt-. ''In the absence of proof of presentment for 
payn1ent, the defendant cannot claiin that the plaintiff 
\vas in default in the payment of the purchase price". 
O'Kane v. North American Distilling Co., 171 NYS 27~, 
(1918). They went on to say: "Even if, however, -vve 
assu1ne that the plaintiff was in default the defendant 
c·nuld not sell the goods without proper notice to the 
plaintiff and there is no evidence in the case that such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
notice was given." The case at bar, like the 0 'Ka,ne 
case is an exantple of a .~ale by a seller alleging 1ner~l~r 
a right to possession as security for the purchase price, 
ntade \vithout any justification. 
Subsection ( 3) of 60-4-9 points out that in such a 
ease as this notice i~ relevant in any issue involving the 
question \vhether the buyer had been in default an un-
reasonable time before the resale \vas 1nade. It is sub-
mitted that even without this provision the ti1ne of the 
resale \vas patently unreasonable, the same being n1ade 
on the day the demand note \vas dated. 
The question of recission is subject to precisely the 
sarne infirn1ities as the resale provision. Sec. 60-5-3. 
'"rhat is, default n1ust be for an unreasonable tune, or the 
right 1nust be reserved. It is doubtful that the defend-
ant elaims a rescission. having based its argument on 
the trial level on the assumption that the plaintiff had 
no rights. Any argument before this court would have 
to be based on the letter of January 31, 1955 which \vas 
transmitted after the resale and thus ineffectiYe prior to 
the conversion claimed. 
Finally Utah Code .A .. nnota ted Sec. 60-4-11 ( 1~1:1:3) 
\vould see1n to stress the importance of the above facts. 
It states · · ... the unpaid seller's right of lien or stop-
pap;P i11 transitu is not affected by any sale, or other 
disposition of thP goods \Yhich the buyer may have 1nade, 
'll nle."·s the seller has as~ented thereto." (emphasis ours). 
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The legislature by these words confirm the view that 
assent hy the seller to a further sale hy hif-; buyer not 
only affects the right~ of the ;seller hut defeats the1n in 
favor of the sub-vendee. This, then, is the underlying 
ha~j~ of the case decisions herein cited, of the Uniform 
Trust Receipts Act, and of the l~nifor1n Sales Act, all of 
'vhich are the foundations of the lTtah Code. It is a 
reeurrent theme that cannot be ignored. 
CONCLlTSION 
The testimony and the docun1entary evidence in this 
ea~e seen1s to clearl:~ establish that the sequence of 
events, the sequence of interest and rights in the prop-
ert:~ and the sequence of right to possession in thi~ 
ca~e, following plaintiff's order fron1 defendant's deal-
er and the dealer's order from the defendant in plain-
tiff\~ name, were, and without doubt the parties involv-
ed intended it to be this 'vay if the doclnnent;s executed 
h~y them are to mean anything at all, as follo,vs: 
Fron1 the manufacturer (the defendant General 
i\l otors) to the en trustor ( G1VLA C). froin the en trustor 
((r~r ~\C) to the dealer,i' trustee (\7alley l\{otor Com-
pan:~) and from the dealer to the retail purehaser (Plain-
tjff). Jones vs. Comercial Investr;nent Trust, 64 U. 151, 
228 Pac. 869 (1924), particularly at 902. By unanimous 
agreement, the plaintiff's right to im1nediate posse;ssion 
waf.: fixed as of the morning of January 20, 1955. Every-
thing agreed and contemplated to be performed had been 
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performed at that tin1e, and plaintiff's rights beca1ne 
vested. It is difficult to see how a self-serving, ex parte 
act h~r the defendant eould destroy these vested rights 
of plaintiff. 
And finally, since a number of referencP3 has been 
ntade to the Sales ... "--ct, the Court's attention is directed 
to Section 60-5-4, 1~tah Code Annotated, 1953, 'vhich 
provides: 
G0-5--±. Action hy Buyer For Converting or De-
taining Goods. - Where the property in the goods 
has passed to the buyer and. the seller 'vrongfully 
neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer 
may maintain any action allowed by law to the 
owner of goods of similar kind 'vhen wrongfully 
converted or withheld. 
Respectfully submitted. 
BULLEN & OLSOK 
By Charles P. Olson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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